Transcript [00:06] Shalom from Jerusalem. This is TV7's [00:09] editor's note. I'm Jonathan Hassan. And [00:12] in today's edition, we are going to [00:14] focus on the latest developments visav [00:16] the Islamic Republic of Iran, the United [00:19] States, Turkey, and the broader region, [00:23] but with core focus on Israel. What is [00:27] Israel's grand strategy? How does it [00:29] employ its various tools of government [00:32] in order to advance its national [00:35] security interests and confront the [00:37] challenges, some of which are [00:38] existential? To do that, we are [00:42] delighted to have Dr. Uziad, Israel's [00:45] former national security adviser, [00:48] director of the National Security [00:50] Council, and the uh a Mossad division [00:54] chief. It's a pleasure having you, sir. [00:56] Good to be here. Well, uh, Dr. Aad, I'd [01:00] like to start by asking you about [01:04] the current state of play before we dive [01:06] into Israel's various strategic [01:09] thinking. [01:11] How does Israel approach the current [01:13] challenge in Lebanon where it is forced [01:18] to employ strategic patience at a time [01:23] when its senior partner and ally, the [01:27] United States, is engaged in Iran [01:31] to confront a much larger [01:35] issue, namely the Islamic Republic, the [01:38] Ayatollah regime in Iran. [01:41] and at the same time ensure that its [01:44] peoples here in Israel are safe and its [01:48] national security interests are [01:50] preserved. [01:52] Well, these are the difficulties that [01:55] alliances have always had when they were [01:59] fighting on various fronts at different [02:01] times and sometimes certain members of [02:05] the alliance took a view which was [02:08] different from others. again because of [02:10] their direct uh involvement also. And we [02:14] all remember the glorious days in which [02:18] for example the Atlantic Alliance fought [02:20] the Second World War when of course [02:22] there were problems with the membership [02:25] and sometimes there were debates between [02:27] the British and the Americans. what [02:30] should be given priority and what is [02:32] more urgent and the position taken by [02:36] each reflected also its individual [02:39] situation. The British having been [02:42] exhausted exposed more needed for [02:46] example an earlier opening a later [02:49] opening of the second front. the [02:51] Americans uh were under pressure from [02:54] the Russians and you know these kind of [02:57] uh considerations that have to take [02:59] place between partners to a coalition [03:02] are typical. At this moment we have a [03:05] situation in which we are in a kind of [03:08] alliance with the United States but we [03:11] are fighting on a number of fronts and [03:14] each one requires different allocation [03:17] of resources and so forth. At the [03:20] moment, the Americans may want, for [03:22] example, that we restrain all activity [03:27] in Lebanon because of a greater priority [03:31] given on their part to the anti-Iranian [03:35] confrontation at this point. uh this of [03:39] course is legitimate and correct but for [03:42] our point of view there is pressing need [03:45] for action now because [03:47] theahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahah [03:48] is putting pressure on us we have not [03:52] done the full job of eliminating [03:54] theahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahah [03:56] quite the contrary it is [03:57] theahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahah [03:58] which still holds at ransom the [04:01] population in Israel's north there is [04:03] tremendous internal pressure about the [04:06] plight of all those civilians who lived [04:09] in northern Lebanon and had to vacate. [04:12] So we have to show that we are taking [04:15] measures to suppress the current [04:18] fighting and firing of all kind of [04:21] explosives into Israeli territory and [04:24] that requires a more active Israeli [04:27] policy [04:29] and but again out of deference to our [04:33] bigger airlines so we are restraining [04:36] our capacity at the moment and I assume [04:40] that we would have to balance [04:42] the ability to maintain the resilience [04:45] and the stamina of our own population to [04:49] sustain this terrible barrage that is [04:52] daily. And at the same time, we should [04:55] be sooner, you know, rather sooner than [04:58] later, take more active possibilities to [05:02] do away with the military capacity of [05:06] this proxy of Iran, which is the which [05:09] is a terror organization recognized as [05:12] such. Now we have certain diplomatic [05:15] options that in the in the time can lead [05:20] to a better coordinated effort in that [05:23] direction and that is negotiating with [05:25] the Libanese government. But this is a [05:28] difficult relationship. The Libanese [05:31] government is also constrained in [05:33] certain ways. But I would assume that uh [05:37] the policy that we would do which would [05:40] be always in tandem with the United [05:42] States and other involved in that would [05:44] be to seek some kind of demunition as [05:49] quickly as possible to the degree of [05:51] harassment that we are [05:54] exposed to and at the same time work [05:57] towards the goal of demilitarizing [06:01] and demobilizing theah. [06:04] and in the same time advancing our [06:06] relations with Lebanon. So you have a [06:09] diplomatic route, you have a constant [06:12] military action that we have to do and [06:15] the fact that we have to calibrate that [06:17] reflects the kind of adjustment that we [06:20] have to do when you look at the totality [06:23] of the effort we're in. Many [06:27] analysts, some of which are so-called [06:31] experts, repeatedly calling Iran to be [06:34] the the the victor in the latest [06:37] engagement. [06:39] Their approach [06:41] claims or their argument is that the [06:45] Iranians are able to [06:48] endure insur insurmountable amounts of [06:51] pain and therefore they will endure. But [06:54] here specifically, [06:56] when I look at the Iranians, they've [06:58] never been in the current state of play [07:01] the way they're facing it today. Even [07:04] during the 8 years war between Iraq and [07:07] Iran, where the Iraqis had the [07:10] qualitative military edge, launching [07:12] daily barges of missiles towards Iranian [07:15] cities. These were statistical [07:19] missiles, munitions which didn't not do [07:23] the the precision damage to Iran's [07:28] military infrastructure, [07:30] failure to [07:32] degrade its capacity to wage war over [07:35] time. [07:37] And that amounted to roughly between 8 [07:39] to 12% [07:41] in extracting damage from relevant [07:44] targets to waging war. [07:46] In the latest campaign of epic fury, 38 [07:51] days in which the Israeli Air Force and [07:54] the American Central Command Air Force, [07:57] both Navy, Army and um Air Force proper, [08:02] have had a precision campaign of more [08:06] than 90% precision, destroying multiple [08:10] targets and Iran's capabilities to wage [08:12] war over time. [08:14] It was less than the campaign against [08:18] Milosovich back in 99 when for 78 days [08:23] the the successful rates of of the the [08:28] precision targeting was less than 70%. [08:32] So we we are here in unprecedented [08:35] levels. It does not necessarily mean [08:37] that the Iranians are suffering from [08:40] direct attacks, but they are suffering [08:42] from the consequences of the Ayatollah [08:45] regime's obstinence. [08:47] Specifically, when we're talking about [08:49] more than 100% inflation, some speak [08:52] over about more than 115% of inflation. [08:57] Over time, this is going to degrade [09:00] their sustainability as a society. [09:04] What needs to be done in order to help [09:06] the Ayatollah regime cross that cliff so [09:11] to speak into the abyss? [09:14] >> The abyss being what being regime [09:17] collapse? [09:19] Well, you know, I've been there at the [09:22] revolution time. I remember the [09:24] revolution. [09:25] After the revolution, many of us thought [09:29] that it may, you know, end itself like [09:33] all revolution that there would be a [09:35] counterrevolution. And there was this [09:37] perhaps naive um expectation of a change [09:42] over time, particularly Israelis who've [09:45] lived and worked in Iran who developed [09:48] an affinity for the Iranian people and [09:51] the Iranian culture. uh you were longing [09:55] and were a kind of a pro-Iranian lobby [09:58] for a resumption of the good old days. [10:01] Um clearly this hasn't happened. [10:05] Um Iran was taken over by [10:07] revolutionaries and revolutionaries are [10:10] revolutionaries and they were militant [10:14] and they were pursuing [10:16] they were hostile to Israel from the [10:18] very first day [10:20] and that but also to the Americans mind [10:23] you remember the hostage taking [10:25] >> 444 days. I remember those days. We [10:29] felt, you know, in in the same battle [10:32] with the United States. We helped as [10:34] much as we could at a time. [10:37] >> And the possibility of affecting some [10:39] political change in Iran was being [10:42] looked at as an option which might [10:44] develop out of its own internal dynamics [10:47] or perhaps with the uh outside help. Um [10:52] there have been such exercises in the [10:54] past. We for example have always [10:57] maintained contacts with the Iranian [10:59] opposition. I met the Karan Sha when he [11:02] was a youngster. Um he was a delightful [11:06] man to talk to and he's still around and [11:09] but we were also in contact with various [11:11] opposition groups like ethnic groups and [11:14] so forth possibly thinking that they may [11:17] be they may be those who would bring [11:19] about some change. But again it hasn't [11:22] happened. It did not happen because the [11:25] regime was oppressive, [11:27] was tough, used all the instruments of [11:31] power, [11:31] >> brutal, [11:32] >> uh, brutal and so forth and they were in [11:34] power. [11:36] Now, what are the odds for some kind of [11:39] a development that would bring about a [11:41] change? No one really knows because such [11:45] things have their own dynamic and you [11:48] have to uh take the pulse of the staying [11:51] power of of others. [11:54] But one might suppose perhaps that uh [12:00] perhaps out of the current economic [12:03] difficulties [12:05] uh that the regime would be weaker [12:08] internally. [12:10] that maybe out of that difficulty may [12:13] arise [12:15] an opposition possibly with a leadership [12:19] that may lead it and bring about some [12:22] kind of a change and it could take [12:24] different forms. It could take change in [12:28] stepby stages. Um it could take uh an [12:32] overnight change to a completely [12:34] different regime that would change its [12:36] color colors and would develop say the [12:40] kind of policy pursued by the previous [12:44] regime pro-western advanced [12:47] u wanting to modernize the Iran that [12:51] many admired and has a tremendous [12:54] potential for. Um now that can be also [12:59] assisted through international activity. [13:02] Now Hummeni [13:05] was always convinced that the battle [13:08] against a nuclear Iran was a facade and [13:12] what was the real intention of the US [13:15] was to replace the regime and this was a [13:19] pretext. Now I don't think it was a [13:21] pretext but I do know two things. At [13:24] some time, efforts, measures taken to [13:27] destabilize have taken place, including [13:31] recently some limited steps. [13:34] And that at various times when America [13:38] and Iran were negotiating the nuclear [13:41] program, the Iranian expectation was [13:44] that America would declare and act [13:48] without interference in Iranian affairs. [13:51] And they've gotten such assurance. [13:55] They were given s that was primary to [13:57] them [13:59] >> under the previous administration. [14:00] >> Well, under which previous [14:02] administration? The American the Obama [14:04] as well as the current one. But they got [14:06] it. I I think that yes, I think you know [14:10] it was even announced no regime change. [14:14] >> The concept the kind of thing that was [14:16] done in Iraq is not to be done in in uh [14:20] in Iran. That was a major major [14:24] expectation, a major demand and a com [14:27] and a commitment given because the [14:29] previous administration thought that [14:32] they could be doing that because they [14:34] had no intention anyway. But they've [14:36] given it. [14:38] >> Now it's no longer a given. Now you have [14:41] had clear indications that it was both [14:44] toyed with and a possibility for the [14:47] future. And to some point some thought [14:50] that this was the hidden agenda all [14:52] along. [14:54] >> Well, yes, some may think that and the [14:57] conspiracies are rampant uh both in [15:00] Europe, the United States um [15:03] inseaminated by the Iranians and and uh [15:07] their [15:08] cohorts of allies to include the [15:10] Russians. Chinese are very much engaged [15:14] utilizing Tik Tok uh as a tool of uh [15:18] disinformation. [15:20] But nonetheless, when you really look at [15:22] the broad scheme of things, [15:25] this is not about the Middle East. This [15:28] is about strategic power competition [15:32] between the United States and China. [15:36] Russia wants to play a role in that and [15:38] wants to see a rules-based order based [15:41] on the Westfallian [15:43] type of of order um [15:47] rearranged to its advantage. [15:50] Something that Putin has made openly uh [15:55] vocal and and he he was very open about [15:58] this. I was surprised that he spoke [15:59] about this as openly as he did when uh a [16:04] Tucker Carlson uh some American [16:08] uh person who changes his mind every 5 [16:11] minutes about what he supports and what [16:12] he doesn't. um he came out to Putin and [16:16] he was hearing about the Vestfallia [16:18] treaties of 1648 for the first time and [16:22] I doubt he knew anything about it. But [16:24] nonetheless, the intentions voiced there [16:27] by the Russian leader indicate a [16:31] expansionist aspiration similar to the [16:35] likes of Petra the first. someone who [16:38] the Russian leader is very keen on [16:41] achieving at least nominal aspects of [16:45] the empirical achievements. [16:48] Same goes for Iran. Iran looks at Iraq [16:52] and this has been in every national uh [16:56] intelligence assessment over the last [16:58] decade at least that I've read [17:02] that Iraq would be the battleground [17:04] between Iran and the United States about [17:08] the hegemonic role of the United States [17:11] in the region and the Iranians view [17:13] themselves as the ones responsible [17:17] for pushing America out of this region. [17:21] This is now also in the latest demands [17:24] relayed to President Trump which the [17:27] American leader thankfully has pushed [17:28] back on in the last 14point plan where [17:32] the Iranians say America needs to move [17:35] out of every country neighboring it, [17:38] remove all its bases, remove its [17:40] involvement, so on and so forth. That is [17:42] not something America can agree to. [17:47] True. uh that is not agreed will not be [17:51] agreed to by the current administration [17:53] that even the previous administration [17:55] would not have expected accepted such a [17:58] total demand to evacuate all bases in [18:01] the Middle East. Uh but why are the [18:05] Iranians doing that? Why are they [18:07] demanding all these measures? [18:11] I I I [18:13] don't know what to think. It could be [18:15] because it does reflect their genuine [18:18] demands and expectations [18:20] >> and beliefs [18:20] >> and beliefs [18:21] >> as 12 Shia. [18:23] >> So, so they they spell them out each one [18:26] on its own on its in its own uh on [18:29] practically every point [18:31] >> or it could be the Iranian way of [18:34] negotiations. You you feel that you have [18:37] a strong bargaining position. So you [18:39] place very very high demands some of [18:42] which you could descend from. Um which [18:46] is I think possibly a combination but at [18:49] the moment they are acting as if they [18:52] are in a position to dictate that or to [18:54] trade it away which does not reflect [18:57] reality on the ground. [18:59] >> Right. But as my Iranian friends uh [19:04] Iranian experts who are think some of [19:06] them understand Iran better than I tell [19:10] me that this regime and the previous one [19:13] in Iran simply cannot bring themselves [19:18] to take more moderate more permatic [19:21] positions. It is in the that in the [19:25] cultural uh ideological [19:28] making of these people, not the [19:32] Iranians, the current group that has [19:35] assumed power as in and is controlling [19:38] Iran. They would continue to present [19:42] maximalist expectations and they may [19:45] possibly think that they can have some. [19:49] And what that what are they putting [19:50] their trust in? They're putting their [19:53] trust in the fact that Trump has already [19:55] shown that he's not going to fight each [19:58] item on the agenda. He has given [20:01] prominence to the nuclear issue than [20:04] lesser prominence to the missile and you [20:07] have a descending order. What is it be? [20:10] What it is? Secondly, they may be also [20:13] counting on Trump's style. Uh [20:18] sometimes Trump is capable. That's his [20:21] way of dealing making deals. He's [20:23] pushing for certain things. If it works, [20:26] fine. If he feels that is, he quits. He [20:30] quits, it goes. And he has this abrupt [20:32] way. And maybe they think that they [20:35] would outlive his patience or his stay [20:38] in power. and he may decide under [20:41] domestic constraints or because of other [20:44] considerations give up on some [20:47] uh and that can happen but for the time [20:50] being they are driving a very hard [20:52] bargain. I I think they are um somewhat [20:55] delusional when it comes to the current [20:58] administration which has been very clear [21:01] under the directives of President Trump [21:04] from day one that when we're talking [21:06] about the Middle East, the the prism in [21:10] which the Trump administration regards [21:12] the Middle East is Iran, Iran, Iran and [21:16] everything they have been operating on [21:18] since day one. uh the way I have [21:22] observed it at least is [21:25] they have pacified every other issue to [21:30] the best degree of their ability in [21:32] order to focus on this issue which is [21:35] the the most significant [21:38] ingredient within the elements of [21:41] strategic power competition uh within [21:44] the context of the crink of course [21:46] China, Russia, Iran and North Korea. [21:49] Now, uh let's take a a not an entire [21:53] stop to this discussion, but a a brief [21:57] sidetrack here. Um I'm familiar with the [22:01] committee that you're heading uh that [22:03] deals with Israel's national security [22:06] interests uh and policy on on a global [22:09] scale. um a group of of very capable [22:13] strategic thinkers, practitioners [22:16] who are [22:19] devising Israel's grand strategy, so to [22:21] speak, on multiple [22:25] directions. What is the key focus these [22:30] days in a world where [22:35] fluidity is [22:38] a term used frequently [22:41] and in our region the sands are shifting [22:46] without any solid bottom? [22:49] >> Well, I can assure you that the task is [22:53] inordinately difficult. [22:57] You know, I've been through times in [22:59] which you had to resolve difficult [23:01] problems, but these ones are so [23:04] complicated and have so many moving [23:07] parts and so many forces at work. some [23:11] of which you don't know exactly where [23:14] that it makes the very task of thinking [23:17] about the shortterm and long-term [23:20] futures is extremely difficult [23:24] intellectually and professionally if you [23:26] wish but if you generalize suppose you [23:30] want to to look what the world is what [23:33] is affecting the world for example you [23:36] have this famous clock that the bulletin [23:40] of atomic scientist publishes in which [23:43] it measures the minutes from midnight [23:45] and which reflect the distance in time [23:48] from a nuclear activation [23:51] and that was started back in the old [23:54] days and it was measured by a few days [23:57] and over the years when things got more [24:00] and more tense it failed to shorter [24:03] spans [24:05] um and during the big crisis in the 60s [24:08] it reached I don't know what an hour [24:10] from uh calamity or something and it's [24:13] been like that over the years. [24:16] Now what they measure is the closest [24:19] ever that we are to a point in which [24:23] there would be a nuclear use. [24:27] So we are actually and how do people [24:29] assess that? Well, they explain because [24:32] the multiple flash points, multiple [24:35] nuclear powers, the fact that nuclear [24:38] use is mentioned more frequently, Putin [24:41] referred to it and others, the fact that [24:43] the battle itself is over nuclear [24:46] programs and proliferation, [24:48] but we live in clearly a more dangerous [24:52] world in that respect. Secondly, you [24:56] look also in the terms how this reflects [24:58] itself in defense expenditures. The [25:01] whole world is spending more in defense. [25:05] There is there are arms races all over. [25:08] Even though if you factor in inflation, [25:11] the spend today is of the United States [25:15] for instance, which outspends everybody [25:17] else combined is lower than what the [25:20] United States spent roughly 30 years [25:22] ago. Yes, that is also true of Israel, [25:25] >> right? [25:25] >> But the fact is that nowadays you see a [25:28] marked and this has been true in the [25:30] last couple of years. marked increase [25:32] >> increase [25:33] >> right [25:34] >> now comes into what is the nature of the [25:37] stuff and here we have the very [25:40] bewildering fact that technology has [25:45] brought into the surface a kind of [25:48] technological military revolutions that [25:51] changed the the nature of the battle [25:54] >> closing sentence within that context [25:57] >> so it is in that context of for example [26:00] the Effect of artificial intelligence. [26:03] Artificial intelligence is [26:05] revolutionizing everything. Everything [26:08] in ways which nobody even the best of [26:11] minds and even the best of informed [26:14] people have a clue where it is leading [26:16] to. But they have to cope with that [26:18] because the race is on. The Chinese are [26:22] pushing ahead in certain areas. So you [26:24] have new types of threats, new types of [26:26] races, new types of uh possibilities. So [26:31] all these are the global context in [26:34] which poor little Israel with its [26:36] limited resources has to steer a course [26:40] which bring about its own defense in the [26:44] face of those who are the bad guys. Not [26:47] only because they want to do us harm but [26:50] because also in value system they are [26:53] not the ones on the side of democracy or [26:57] the kind of norms that we in the western [27:00] alliances have been uh part of. [27:03] Thankfully uh over the course of history [27:06] we had figures such as King David who [27:08] had to confront Goliath and against all [27:10] odds with uh the assistance of uh uh [27:15] superior power from above has brought [27:17] about uh decisive victory [27:20] >> very well we have there's also an [27:21] advantage we have a long history of [27:23] survival [27:24] >> indeed [27:25] >> but we have also a number of [27:27] >> failures [27:29] >> right which there are lessons to be [27:31] learned undoubtedly [27:33] Dr. Dr. Uza, thank you very much for all [27:36] your insights today. [27:38] >> I'd like also to thank you at home. [27:39] Until our next edition from here in [27:41] Jerusalem, shalom.
