Transcript [00:07] Shalom from Jerusalem. I'm Jonathan [00:08] Esser, and this is TV7's Editor's Note. [00:11] And in today's edition, we'll discuss [00:13] the latest developments with regard to [00:16] the last-minute decision by President [00:19] Donald Trump to avert a decisive [00:22] offensive against the Islamic Republic [00:24] of Iran. What actually happened there? [00:26] Are the negotiations truly taking place [00:29] behind the scenes? Can Iran, the [00:31] Ayatollah regime, be trusted? And what [00:34] are the derivatives thereof throughout [00:36] the Middle East? We will also speak [00:38] briefly on the latest deal that was [00:42] reported with regard to the Gaza Strip, [00:45] a gradual process of disarming Hamas. [00:48] Can a designated terrorist organization [00:50] responsible for the massacre of October [00:52] 7th be trusted? And if not, what should [00:56] be done? And we will, of course, discuss [00:59] a few other elements related to Lebanon [01:02] and elsewhere. [01:03] But before that, let's introduce our [01:06] guest for today, [01:07] our dear friend, Dr. Rafael Bardají, [01:11] who formerly served as Spain's National [01:12] Security Advisor, currently the CEO of [01:15] Worldwide Strategy. It's always a [01:17] pleasure to have you with us, Dr. [01:18] Rafael. [01:20] >> Thank you for having me, Jonathan. [01:22] >> Absolutely. Well, let's dive immediately [01:25] into the [01:26] most significant headline, that is the [01:31] President's decision in the United [01:33] States to not attack Iran. [01:36] He spoke at Air Force One in a press [01:40] gaggle to journalists, during the course [01:42] of which he said that the Saudis have [01:45] told him not to attack, as well as the [01:47] Qataris, the Emirates, apparently, and [01:50] the Iranians themselves. Now, the [01:52] Iranians earlier today have already [01:54] noted that that are no negotiations [01:56] taking place, in contrary to the claims [01:59] made by the president and that the only [02:02] talks currently underway are the ones [02:04] between Tehran and the Sultanate of Oman [02:07] about how to essentially control the [02:09] Strait of Hormuz. What are we to make [02:11] out of that? [02:13] >> Well, I think it's very difficult to [02:15] follow any event now going on if you [02:17] attend only or you listen only to the [02:19] declaration by both sides. [02:22] Iranian leaders and [02:24] uh especially in Trump as well or the [02:26] White House officials. [02:27] Uh I think we need to to focus more on [02:30] the fact on the ground, you know. [02:32] And uh the latest is that [02:35] uh the United States forces from the [02:36] region [02:37] are moving from some bases in in in [02:41] Iraq, Jordan, and and Kuwait uh around [02:45] the region. So, they are repositioning [02:48] Israel and other other locations outside [02:50] of the Middle East. Uh I don't know what [02:53] that would could means. If this is just [02:55] a protection [02:57] measure in the face of an attack or is [02:59] because there is just that they need [03:01] some rest uh after so many months of [03:04] being ready to to do something big, you [03:06] know. [03:07] Uh [03:08] secondly, the rest of the fleet is still [03:10] there. [03:11] Uh so, the capabilities to strike Iran [03:14] are still there. [03:16] Uh there is no sign that they would move [03:17] out of the region anytime soon. [03:20] Um I know that we all know or we think [03:24] that President Trump always [03:26] prefer a diplomatic solution to a [03:29] military combat operation. [03:32] But uh as you said before in the [03:34] introduction, Iran is an specialist of [03:37] the deal uh [03:39] in cheating and in buying time. And um [03:44] so, I my opinion is that any deal will [03:47] be almost impossible to to achieve in [03:50] Western terms. [03:52] And uh [03:53] at the end of the road, uh we will be uh [03:55] still having to take a decision what to [03:57] do militarily to force Iran to abandon [04:01] completely their ambitions. And [04:03] to my own personal view, to promote any [04:06] kind of regime change within Iran, which [04:08] is the only solution to a country that [04:10] is not normal. It's a sporting [04:12] revolution. It's trying to be a Germanic [04:13] in the region. It's trying to uh be uh [04:17] significant in destabilizing the whole [04:19] world. And I think it's that totally [04:21] unacceptable. [04:23] >> Well, it it is clear also from past [04:26] instances that the Iranians have reached [04:28] out to the Saudis, the Qataris, and [04:30] others and threatened of uh to to, you [04:34] know, lash out at those countries in the [04:36] event of such a decisive attack against [04:38] Iran. [04:39] Uh that has triggered those phone [04:41] conversations clearly with President [04:43] Trump that ultimately decided to not [04:46] attack immediately. What is the calculus [04:49] though considering the fact that the [04:51] naval blockade is in place [04:53] against the Iranians. They are being [04:57] really hammered when it comes to their [04:59] economy. Scott Bessent, the Secretary of [05:02] the Treasury, has mentioned during the [05:04] cabinet meeting at Camp David over the [05:06] weekend that uh the Iranian bank, [05:09] central bank, has already collapsed uh a [05:12] couple of months ago. And since then, to [05:14] date, they are not able to pay their own [05:17] forces. Now, [05:19] that shows cracks, quite the significant [05:23] cracks in the makeup of this regime, but [05:25] they're still holding out. [05:28] >> Yes. I think from the Saudi perspective, [05:30] uh [05:31] the picture has been more complicated [05:33] lately because of the Houthi's attacks. [05:35] So, if they are planning some kind of [05:37] counteraction, uh probably they don't [05:40] want to open a second front with Iran [05:41] directly. If there's any American [05:43] intervention, there will be retaliatory [05:46] strikes from Iran to all the [05:48] neighborhood. So, I think they they want [05:50] to focus now in the in the short term on [05:53] on on Yemen, and that may have caused [05:57] the petition to delay any major [05:59] offensive operation against Iran, [06:02] but let's see in the future. [06:03] Uh [06:04] you mentioned the regime is not so solid [06:07] as they tend to portray themselves [06:10] abroad. Uh [06:11] and and the economic pressure uh may [06:14] still uh be hurting and will be even [06:17] more important in the near future, and [06:19] see how the things develop internally [06:21] and domestically in Iran. But uh for the [06:23] time being, I think uh the delay is not [06:27] uh a rejection of any military action in [06:29] the future. It's just a a new pause [06:32] uh by President Trump to try to [06:34] accommodate the different and [06:36] contradictory forces in place in around [06:39] the problem. [06:40] >> So, we could dub this as a tactical [06:42] pause rather than [06:44] uh strategic shift. Naturally, the the [06:47] redeploying of troops, I think it's also [06:49] from the Kingdom of Bahrain from the the [06:51] port in Manama uh of uh US Central [06:54] Command NAVCENT, the naval component [06:56] thereof, has also repositioned itself. [06:59] Uh this has been long in the making from [07:01] what I understand, and they have [07:04] done so for the purpose of force [07:06] protection since uh many American forces [07:09] have sustained various degrees of [07:10] injuries during the course of the 5 [07:12] months of fighting where the Iranians [07:14] are blatantly also launching attacks [07:16] against US bases throughout the region, [07:18] but also beyond that, against civilian [07:20] infrastructure in the Gulf countries. [07:23] The Houthi angle is quite interesting. [07:25] They have not joined the Iranians as [07:28] many have predicted initially, but [07:31] nonetheless, they are [07:33] continuing to frustrate uh the freedom [07:36] of navigation now in the strategic [07:38] strait of Bab el-Mandeb, particularly [07:41] vessels belonging to the Saudis, but [07:44] they they may expand those operations in [07:46] the event that uh the Saudis do utilize [07:50] or rather trigger the Saudi-led [07:53] coalition that was formed last week and [07:55] aims to ensure freedom of navigation not [07:58] only there, but also in the Red Sea, of [08:00] course, and the Gulf of Aden. [08:03] >> Yes, but I think the Houthis represent a [08:05] different threat from from Iran. [08:07] They can be contained, they can be [08:09] punished. [08:10] And their capability to sustain uh [08:14] blockade of the Bab el-Mandeb uh Strait [08:16] is is almost uh insignificant. So, I [08:20] think I think uh yes, there may be some [08:22] attempts to attack the the freedom of [08:24] navigation, but with the forces in [08:26] presence, I think the Houthis have [08:28] nothing nothing to do uh in the future [08:31] about that. Not only because of the [08:33] Saudi, but also of the British, the [08:34] Americans, and the French. And uh I [08:36] think uh if they try really to attempt [08:38] any blockade of the strait, uh they will [08:41] suffer a lot of uh military punishment. [08:44] Uh it's a different level of the and [08:46] different nature of the threat that [08:48] represents uh the Revolutionary Guards [08:51] in power in Tehran. [08:54] >> 5 months in, and the Europeans are yet [08:56] to be seen taking an active role in this [08:59] engagement against the Islamic Republic [09:02] of Iran, despite the fact that the [09:04] economic repercussions [09:06] of the latest developments, particularly [09:08] also Iran's ongoing belligerence against [09:11] freedom of navigation in the Strait of [09:13] Hormuz, [09:14] are predominantly impacting the [09:16] Europeans, as well as, of course, uh you [09:19] know, the the Far East, Asia, [09:22] particularly Japan, South Korea, even uh [09:25] the the China that has been quite uh [09:28] dismayed by the latest developments [09:30] there. What What can you tell us about [09:32] that, and to what degree [09:34] is this also um showing not just [09:37] weakness from a European perspective, [09:40] but a lack of tools to follow through on [09:42] the necessity to protect their own [09:44] national security interests, which are [09:46] very much aligned with those of the [09:48] United States. [09:50] >> Yes, indeed. Actually, I think European [09:52] countries are suffering more [09:54] economically [09:55] from the conflict in the in the in the [09:57] Gulf than the Americans, for instance, [09:59] no? Or [10:00] even the Chinese, which were preparing [10:02] in advance with oil reserves that we [10:05] what we didn't have in place. [10:07] So, I think the interest of Europe is to [10:10] to to find a solution to the problem in [10:13] any way, you know? [10:14] The issue here, I think, is that the [10:16] European has been dealing with the [10:17] Ukraine war and invasion by Russia by [10:20] Russia of Ukraine. And we have invested [10:23] so much money and attention and [10:25] strategic thinking that that we are [10:27] unable to shift resources from that [10:29] conflict to any other region. Europe [10:32] cannot fight a two-front war, no? [10:34] Uh unfortunately, and we have seen that [10:36] when the French and the British tried to [10:38] send to the to the region naval forces, [10:40] no? We had a hard time uh with the ships [10:44] and the capabilities that may arrive at [10:46] the at the end of the process. So, I [10:48] think the Europeans need not only to [10:50] rethink the strategic concept so not to [10:52] be trapped exclusively by the conflict [10:54] in Ukraine [10:55] and to focus exclusively on the Russian [10:58] threat, but also to think about the [11:01] forces structure that we need to address [11:04] all the threat that are emanating from [11:05] other regions. Unfortunately, [11:08] we don't have yet the budget in place to [11:11] sustain the modernization and the [11:12] projection of the forces that we need to [11:14] deal with any other kind of threats. [11:17] So, I think [11:18] the problem here is not only a political [11:20] one, it's also a capability [11:23] one, no? And that something has to be [11:26] addressed and solved in the future, but, [11:29] you know, defense is a a process. You [11:30] cannot build capability overnight. It [11:33] takes time. And when you are spending [11:35] most of the your capabilities in one [11:37] front, which is which is Ukraine today, [11:40] it's very difficult to expand your [11:42] forces to deal with other [11:44] theater of operations. [11:46] >> So, the billions of billions of dollars, [11:49] or rather billions of billions of euros, [11:51] that Germany spent, that's France [11:53] supposedly sought to spend, and and [11:55] Britain, [11:57] these funds are not [11:59] uh making them [12:01] war-ready, so to speak, in order to [12:03] confront far-away threats that are [12:07] impacting their national security [12:09] interests by means of, you know, freedom [12:11] of navigation, the the straits that [12:14] we're talking about, as well as the [12:16] impact on the economies [12:18] uh from commodities that are unable now [12:22] to reach the the continent of Europe? [12:26] >> Yes, unfortunately, I think when you [12:27] look at the consumptions of ammunition [12:30] and [12:31] uh defensive rockets uh [12:34] in the recent conflict, [12:36] uh we don't have the stocks, and we [12:38] don't have the way to produce in in [12:40] bigger quantities on time. [12:42] Uh we need we need months, if not years, [12:44] to have the the the stock needed to [12:46] sustain a high-intensity operation. [12:49] So, that's one problem. The second thing [12:50] is that we have uh spend a lot of money [12:53] in big platforms, [12:55] uh and we are lacking the the [12:56] capabilities of uh enablers. And uh we [13:00] don't have the intelligence, we don't [13:01] have the satellite, we don't have the [13:03] communications [13:04] uh that America has been providing to [13:06] the for European security. And thirdly, [13:09] we have uh spend much of our new [13:10] capabilities in drones and anti-drones [13:13] uh systems in Ukraine. So, I think [13:15] that's why we need to rethink our [13:18] efforts, where to put the eggs in a [13:20] different baskets, but uh in a rational [13:23] way, and uh be aware that there are [13:26] threats that are emanating from [13:27] different regions and different [13:29] theaters, not exclusively in the eastern [13:31] front with Russia and Ukraine. And [13:33] that's something the European has not [13:35] been able to discuss yet, unfortunately. [13:39] >> Well, the the Iranians have worked [13:41] tirelessly to build up their proxies [13:44] over the years. Obviously, since October [13:46] 7th, thank God that Israel really [13:49] battered those proxies to to points that [13:53] we haven't seen since the early days of [13:56] the construction of those terror [13:58] organizations. But nonetheless, they're [14:01] still a menace. [14:03] If we're talking specifically about [14:04] Iraq, we saw last week the attacks by [14:08] Hashd al-Shaabi, the Popular [14:09] Mobilization Forces, with focus also on [14:11] Kata'ib Hezbollah, launching attacks [14:13] towards the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, [14:16] Aramco, other energy infrastructure [14:18] there in the the Kingdom. The United [14:20] States joined the Saudis in retaliating [14:23] against this. This caused obviously a [14:26] very frustrating [14:28] uh [14:29] event where we saw the the newly [14:32] appointed prime minister coming and and [14:35] discussing with Hashd al-Shaabi what [14:37] needs to be done in order to avoid those [14:39] type of attacks from outside. And now [14:42] we're seeing the Iranians once again [14:44] prompting these terrorist organizations [14:47] to potentially even attack Syria to try [14:50] and cause more [14:52] instability in the region in the event [14:54] of such a decisive strike against the [14:56] Ayatollah regime in Iran. What are we to [14:58] make out of that and to what degree [15:01] would such a decisive strike potentially [15:04] lead [15:05] to a multi-front war yet again [15:08] reignited? [15:10] >> Well, I think their capabilities are [15:12] limited, [15:13] fortunately. [15:15] Uh [15:15] and to quote an old an old Soviet [15:19] king uh [15:21] phrase, [15:22] you have to address the head of the [15:23] snake. [15:24] I mean, if the if the proxies are [15:26] mobilized, it's because there is [15:28] somebody in Tehran pressing the right [15:30] button on the keys to mobilize them. [15:32] Though, I have to say that they have [15:34] been quite calm and distant from the the [15:39] orders of Iran in the in the latest [15:41] conflict, you know. So, [15:43] but yes, the problem is not in Iraq, [15:45] it's not in Syria, [15:47] the real problem is in Tehran. And [15:49] that's something that we cannot forget. [15:52] If you want to dismantle and you want to [15:54] eliminate the proxies of Tehran, [15:56] uh go for Tehran [15:58] first, and then we'll see, you know. It [16:00] will be much more manageable than the [16:02] other way around. [16:04] >> Let's turn to the historic [16:09] town of El Alamein, where obviously the [16:12] World War II [16:14] context always comes to mind, but [16:16] nonetheless, negotiations took place [16:18] there between the United States, being [16:22] oversight to those discussions by means [16:25] of Steve Whitcoff, the presidential [16:27] advisor or envoy [16:30] for peace negotiations, as well as Jared [16:33] Kushner, who is an external advisor to [16:35] the president, [16:37] alongside the Qataris, the Egyptians, [16:39] and the Turks talking with the Islamist [16:42] terrorist organization Hamas [16:44] to reach a [16:47] a deal that is supposed to bring about [16:50] their disarmament [16:52] and the withdrawal of Israeli forces [16:54] from the Gaza Strip to reignite [16:56] President Trump's so-called 20-point [16:58] plan. They have managed to reach some [17:02] sort of an agreement that is essentially [17:05] imposed now on Israel. [17:07] And looking at this, it's not about [17:10] disarming Hamas immediately, it's about [17:13] a gradual process where Hamas disarms [17:16] somewhat and Israel then withdraws [17:20] somewhat and this keeps on building up [17:23] instead of just saying, "Hamas, you are [17:25] with your back against the wall, disarm [17:27] or else." That is not something they [17:29] want to see apparently. And now we hear [17:32] even the United Nations Secretary [17:34] General Antonio Guterres, who has been a [17:38] counterproductive [17:39] official to say it mildly, coming out [17:42] and saying we should not question the [17:45] this deal and we should just go ahead [17:48] and implement it as quickly as possible. [17:50] This doesn't sound very promising. [17:53] >> Yeah. [17:54] Yeah, okay. Let me say first that the [17:56] only good thing is coming from Antonio [17:58] Guterres is that he's ending soon. [18:01] Other than that, he has been a terrible [18:04] UN Secretary General. I'm not sure what [18:08] is coming, but it can't be worse [18:10] probably. [18:11] Secondly, I think [18:13] the strategic interest and the security [18:15] security interest of Israel should be [18:17] should be safeguarded [18:18] at all costs. And that means first of [18:20] all to to keep this buffer zone of [18:23] security between the Israeli soil and [18:27] Hamas. And that has been created by a no [18:30] man's land of 100 m if not kilometers [18:34] inside Gaza. [18:36] There is the wall of sand. There is the [18:38] the the placing of every building and [18:41] the movement of civilians that cannot be [18:43] accepted to return into that area. [18:45] That's for sure because that's the only [18:47] way the IDF can guarantee the safety of [18:49] Israelis [18:50] near the border. Secondly, on the [18:53] disarmament, yes, on a perfect world, [18:56] Hamas will [18:57] bring the weapons to the table in [19:00] overnight, but that's not realistic. [19:03] Because it's physically impossible and [19:06] because probably they don't want it. So, [19:08] what what the IDF and I think what [19:10] should retain is the ability to pursue [19:14] and and eliminate [19:16] any [19:17] terrorist threat or major threat. I [19:19] mean, starting with the the high ranks [19:23] members of Hamas, [19:25] we saw the last week. So, [19:27] probably Hamas is trying to achieve a [19:30] situation like Hezbollah in Lebanon. [19:33] Trying to be important politically, [19:36] retain some light weaponry to maintain [19:39] control over the domestic population in [19:42] Gaza. And [19:45] survive this disarmament process [19:47] politically. [19:48] But again, [19:50] the alternative is a full invasion in [19:54] order to dismember Hamas completely. [19:57] That's not in the in the [20:00] on the table today. And I think [20:03] because of that, what Israel should [20:05] strike and try to achieve from the out [20:08] of the negotiation is to preserve the [20:10] security that has been obtained already [20:13] with the deployment of the IDF inside [20:15] Gaza [20:16] in the near future. [20:19] >> Is that realistic though within the [20:21] current political climate considering [20:24] the pressures that have been mounting in [20:26] Washington to achieve some breakthrough [20:29] with regard to the Gaza Strip all the [20:31] while Israel is looking on the sidelines [20:33] and saying, you know, just over the [20:35] weekend five weapons caches, storage [20:38] units filled with weapons and munitions [20:41] were destroyed in Gaza in areas [20:44] controlled by Hamas. And the Islamist [20:47] Hamas continues to consolidate power. It [20:49] continues to recruit primarily children [20:52] between the ages of 14 and 16. [20:56] And that just indicates that they're not [20:59] willing [21:00] to to relinquish control anytime soon. [21:03] And it's also now coming out and saying, [21:05] you know, uh [21:06] they're not willing to to follow through [21:09] on their agreement to accept such a [21:11] disarmament plan unless Israel agrees to [21:14] it first and it shows the signals that [21:16] it's willing to withdraw by withdrawing [21:18] also first. That that is genuinely [21:21] unheard of uh [21:23] from from an Israeli perspective, [21:25] particularly now that we are also in an [21:27] election season here in Israel. It would [21:29] be devastating for the the current [21:32] government, to say mildly, if it were to [21:35] seek re-election. [21:38] >> Yes, but at the same time we have to [21:40] accept that the security and the safety [21:42] of the Israelis on the side [21:44] along the border of Gaza have been very [21:46] much improved. Uh so, being realistic, I [21:50] think the situation is far from being [21:52] perfect, but it's no worse than the few [21:55] years ago, no? And uh and [21:57] uh that's because the IDF is present and [22:00] is holding the line. [22:01] And also acting [22:04] on the the no man's land or the buffer [22:06] zone. [22:07] So, that is a is a freedom of action [22:09] that IDF should retain at all cost. [22:11] Whenever there is a threat emerging [22:13] against the IDF forces or civilian [22:16] population, the IDF should retain the [22:18] right to act as it did in the past and [22:20] I'm sure they will do in the future. [22:23] Uh [22:24] secondly, I think uh [22:26] despite what is said in the media, which [22:28] is already in a pre-electoral mood, uh [22:32] uh [22:33] the pressures [22:34] from from the uh board of peace [22:37] doesn't come essentially from the White [22:39] House, which has been quite patient, I [22:41] think, and they understand the security [22:43] needs of Israel. The other [22:46] members and other countries which are in [22:48] accelerating the or making more noise [22:50] around the the fact that Israel should [22:52] withdraw, like Turkey, for instance. [22:54] Uh [22:54] but I think that the uh still the major [22:57] player here is the United States, is [22:59] President Trump. And even if he wants to [23:02] see a different Gaza, uh I think he [23:05] understands that this is a long process. [23:08] We have to wait until the pilot areas [23:10] are, you know, developed and assessed. [23:13] And, obviously, he agreed entirely with [23:16] the disarming of Hamas. [23:18] How to do that, how long it will take, [23:20] are open questions. But, I I I don't see [23:23] any major threat in the short term or [23:26] before the elections in mid-November in [23:29] the United States and the general [23:30] elections in Israel in October. [23:33] I may be wrong with the timing, but I [23:35] think that such a pressure is not [23:37] assisting today on the table from the [23:39] American side. [23:41] >> Indeed. And, of course, the midterm [23:43] elections is merely 1 month after [23:45] Israeli elections, parliamentary [23:47] elections here, [23:49] which nobody really knows the outcome. [23:52] As of now, it usually is decided merely [23:55] in the last 72 to 48 hours before an [23:58] election [24:00] is [24:00] concluded. But, [24:03] we don't have very much time left. And, [24:04] I want to point out that Turkey, as you [24:06] mentioned, is really pushing for the [24:09] withdrawal of IDF forces from the Gaza [24:11] Strip. It also had its foreign minister, [24:14] a country done host the leader of Hamas, [24:18] Khalil al-Hayya, just last week, during [24:20] the course of which Ankara's top [24:22] diplomat has pledged Turkey's support [24:25] for Hamas and pledged to continue to [24:28] fight for the Palestinian cause, quote [24:30] unquote. That That is something that is [24:33] quite troubling, considering also the [24:35] unique relationship between President [24:36] Trump and his Turkish counterpart, Recep [24:39] Tayyip Erdogan. [24:41] >> Yes, indeed. But, [24:42] despite the fact that [24:44] Erdogan wants to play a bigger role in [24:46] the region and take benefit of any shift [24:50] in position from Qatar, as well, related [24:52] to Hamas, I think it still Turkey has a [24:55] lot of problems and a lot of a lot of [24:57] weaknesses [24:59] to develop this kind of vision. But [25:02] obviously, it is an aesthetic rival [25:05] of Israel. Not only Israel, also the [25:07] Saudis, also the Iranians, [25:09] also Egypt. So, I think [25:12] Erdogan's position is much more [25:14] complicated than we tend to see, you [25:16] know, [25:16] in general terms. But yeah, you have to [25:19] keep an eye because the rhetoric and the [25:22] narrative there is very anti-Israel. [25:25] Uh it's very anti-Western, I would say. [25:27] And that's something that everyone, even [25:29] in Washington, should take into that [25:32] account [25:33] for the future relation with the [25:34] country. But uh [25:36] I'm concerned, [25:38] but not in the in the immediate term. I [25:40] think it's because of the direction it [25:42] sets for Turkey in the future. [25:45] >> I couldn't agree more. Raphael, we have [25:48] roughly 1 minute left to [25:51] to close our program for today. [25:55] Within those 60 seconds, could you give [25:57] us a broader strategic understanding? [26:00] What should we focus on [26:02] within the current climate that we are [26:04] faced with? [26:07] >> Well, I think it's important to to bring [26:09] to the table the latest idea of [26:11] President Trump to build an alliance for [26:14] defending the Western civilization. [26:17] And I think this is a place where two [26:19] countries are going to be relevant, [26:21] United States and Israel. And I think [26:23] it's an opportunity [26:24] to inject again Israel in the global [26:27] world in a different perspective, in a [26:29] more positive way. And I think it's an [26:31] idea and a concept that we all should [26:33] explore for the benefit of the Western [26:35] civilization, which is our civilization [26:37] under threat. [26:39] >> Indeed. Well, Dr. Raphael Bardaji, CEO [26:42] of World Strategy, formerly Spain's [26:44] National Security Advisor, thank you [26:46] very much for all of your valuable [26:48] insights today. [26:50] >> Thank you to you, Jonathan. A pleasure [26:51] being here. [26:53] >> It's uh the pleasure is all ours and I'd [26:55] like to immediately also thank all of [26:57] you at home. Until our next edition from [26:59] here in Jerusalem, wishing you a blessed [27:01] week. [27:22] >> My name is Eran Lerman. I used to be [27:24] deputy national security advisor to the [27:26] government of Israel. Currently, vice [27:28] president of the Jerusalem Institute for [27:30] Strategy and Security, a think tank, and [27:32] the editor of the Jerusalem Strategic [27:34] Tribune. For the last few years, [music] [27:36] I've been a regular panelist for TV7, a [27:40] fantastic opportunity to bring deep and [27:44] analytical perspectives [music] [27:46] to the debate over regional affairs, [27:49] Israeli affairs, international affairs, [27:51] in the company of some of the best minds [27:53] in Israel.
