Transcript [00:17] Shalom and welcome to Jerusalem Studio. [00:20] The American Israeli war against Iran [00:23] seems to have reached an on-again [00:26] off-again status with strikes and [00:28] negotiations taking place [00:30] intermittently. The focus is apparently [00:33] on commerce, energy, shipping, and sea [00:35] lines of communications. Almost [00:38] forgotten are the two major war aims, [00:40] namely toppling the despotic Islamic [00:44] regime and doing away with the remnants [00:46] of their efforts to acquire nuclear [00:48] weapons. The second issue, whatever [00:51] happened to the Iranian enriched uranium [00:55] and equipment will be analyzed by our [00:58] distinguished panel of experts today. [01:01] They includes Mr. David Albbright [01:04] joining us who is the president of the [01:07] Institute for Science and International [01:09] Security uh or the good ISIS as we know [01:12] it. It's a pleasure having you with us, [01:14] David. [01:15] >> Good to be here. [01:17] as well as Dr. Uzi Aad who is Israel's [01:20] former national security adviser as well [01:22] as a Msad division chief. It's a [01:24] pleasure having you with us Uzi. [01:27] >> Good to be here. [01:29] >> And last but certainly not least, our [01:30] TV7 editor at large, Mr. Amir Olen. [01:33] Amir, set the stage for us. So you all [01:36] remember the old television quiz show, [01:40] whatever happened to usually people, but [01:44] in this case, whatever happened to these [01:48] few hundred kilos of enriched uranium? [01:51] What happened to Pax Mountain? What [01:54] happened to the Iranian nuclear project? [01:57] Now, we must be modest. We don't presume [02:01] to know everything. Maybe even as we [02:04] speak, there are efforts to [02:07] clandestinely or overtly or whatever uh [02:10] take out um all of these threats to [02:15] Israel, the United States, and mankind [02:19] at large. But if um we only uh tackle [02:24] what the eye sees, apparently it is more [02:28] urgent for the United States to solve [02:31] the problem of Hermuz of the uh allied [02:36] or at least the partners in the Persian [02:39] Gulf get back to normal, get the economy [02:44] um from under the weight of fuel prices [02:49] and the [02:50] as the midterm elections are near us and [02:54] we should refocus our attention again on [02:58] the nuclear project [03:00] >> which is the most serious issue at hand [03:03] and President Trump has mentioned this [03:06] in his latest remarks and I'm encouraged [03:09] by the fact that he keeps saying that [03:10] yes it's about the nuclear issue uh [03:13] since many people tend to uh dismiss it [03:16] somewhat [03:17] >> because because there's a difference [03:18] always between the urgent and the [03:20] critical. [03:21] >> Absolutely. This is critical. [03:22] >> And yet we're talking, of course, about [03:25] the uh the first Iran war, if we may [03:29] call it that way, the 12-day war, which [03:31] Israel launched on June the 13th of last [03:34] year. um with a cherry on top. Merely a [03:37] couple of uh days later on the 23rd of [03:41] June uh we had the United States join [03:43] with Operation Midnight Hammer Natans [03:46] Ferdo and Isis Fahan were uh obliterated [03:50] quote unquote uh with the highlyenriched [03:54] uranium of up to 60% purity buried deep [03:58] inside at least one of those sites. And [04:02] uh we had uh much more to do with uh the [04:05] aspects of the nuclear uh infrastructure [04:09] that we discussed uh with with quite [04:12] length in our previous episodes of uh [04:16] Jerusalem Studio. But nonetheless, the [04:18] current state of play remains dire. The [04:21] Iranians have reportedly moved some [04:24] centrifuges of IR6 into a heavily [04:28] fortified subterranean infrastructure [04:30] called pickaxe. And on that, Mr. David [04:34] Albbright, one of the leading experts uh [04:37] globally on this issue, uh I'd like to [04:40] ask you, what are we to take out of the [04:43] current complexity at hand and what is [04:45] the urgency behind it? [04:48] Well, I think it, you know, as time goes [04:50] on, I mean, you and no monitoring of any [04:53] type and um and difficulty getting uh [04:57] information other means, the chance that [05:00] Iran will try something on tour [05:03] increases and and so pickaxe is a real [05:07] threat. It's also a symbolic uh threat. [05:10] I mean, it's it's heavily fortified. Um [05:13] it's quarteredly some several thousand [05:16] centrifuges were moved in as you said. [05:19] Um I what we hear in Washington is that [05:22] there's no enrichment activity going on. [05:24] They haven't Ron hasn't connected the [05:26] centrifuges together but it's a it's a [05:28] pretty big underground site. Some of [05:30] it's still under construction, but it [05:33] could hold an enrichment plan. it could [05:35] hold parts of the process of turning the [05:38] weapon grade uranium if if that's what [05:40] Iran makes eventually into metal for use [05:43] in nuclear weapons. So, it's a site that [05:46] that um [05:49] is an actual threat, but it's also a [05:52] symbol of of unfinished action. I mean [05:54] the the both major military campaigns, [05:58] the one in June and then last winter. I [06:00] mean in my view stopped prematurely and [06:03] and left places unattacked and and this [06:07] pickaxe mountain is perhaps the the most [06:10] important that we know of and and and [06:13] represents unfinished business. [06:15] >> Thank you, Mr. Albbright. Uh Dr. [06:17] I'd like to uh have your take on this [06:20] and uh to add also I mean uh with uh [06:24] David saying that uh Iran being able to [06:27] push forward on tour um is increasing [06:31] quote unquote is something that should [06:34] alarm us quite heftily. [06:38] >> Well uh sure we have to look at it with [06:41] concern uh for two reasons. Uh, one has [06:46] uh all these u uncert in uncertude about [06:50] the exact state of affairs as far as [06:54] activity being pursued or amounts of of [06:58] file material that have been enriched to [07:00] different degrees. always leave us with [07:03] a at least as far as I can tell um with [07:07] things which are unclear but that there [07:10] is activity going on is clear and uh in [07:14] in essence we have right now a kind of [07:18] negotiations over the future of that [07:21] program. So nothing is frozen. you see [07:25] Iranian activity to preserve or to [07:28] maintain or some some areas to act. Um [07:33] but we are unclear about what the [07:36] purpose is and one must assume into the [07:40] factor of the supposition [07:43] that uh the Iranian [07:46] um policy u against a backdrop of what [07:50] transpired is that there is a greater [07:52] need for Iran to acquire such capacity. [07:56] So as far as motivation goes um there is [08:00] a program that we have to be concerned [08:02] about because there may be an intention [08:05] to move forward but then we have those [08:08] negotiations going on and they are [08:11] interrelated to uh to the other theaters [08:15] where negotiations are going on with [08:18] Iran namely the hormuz and the oil [08:21] sector um from that area which is the [08:26] strategic thing that is leveled or [08:28] leveraged against uh the program and you [08:32] have the issue of the survivability of [08:35] the regime um which has been put in [08:38] question because at some points it been [08:41] alluded to that possibly the purpose or [08:46] one purpose of the international [08:48] coalition that is seeking to curtail um [08:52] Iran's nuclear capacity might like to [08:55] see that happen as a result of a regime [08:58] change in Iran which is still something [09:01] which is dynamic. So all these [09:03] dimensions are interrelated and we have [09:06] indeed to see whether in the foreseeable [09:10] future there may be an agreement and [09:13] then of course the the devil will be in [09:15] the details that to what extent it will [09:18] be just declaratory or measures would be [09:21] undertaken. For example something that [09:24] is sorely lacking is the verification [09:27] capacity. we are blinded by um uh some [09:31] the limited ability that there is to [09:34] verify certain agreements if they are [09:37] reached. So, but this may unfold uh in [09:40] the immediate future. We'll see if [09:43] there's an agreement. It's one thing we [09:45] have to be concerned about it, but it [09:48] leads to one direction. If there isn't [09:51] then we may see the continuation of [09:54] pressures and this confrontation which [09:58] may remain active in which other [10:01] theaters are being employed but the [10:04] ultimate goal is to have an effect on [10:07] the nuclear program. [10:09] >> Thank you Dr. Mr. Orin. [10:11] >> Well both uh David and Uzi mentioned [10:14] monitoring and verification. If there is [10:17] an agreement, it will fall to the IAEA. [10:20] It so happens that Raphael Gi is now one [10:25] of the contenders for Secretary General [10:27] of the United Nations. Now, whether he [10:30] has a real chance or not will be seen. [10:33] Um perhaps there comes a time when a [10:37] woman would be uh appointed by the [10:40] Security Council and there are several [10:43] contenders, female contenders. But [10:45] should GI leave the IAEA [10:49] uh for uh New York, one wonders whether [10:52] it will have any impact on the work of [10:54] the international [10:56] uh agency for atomic uh affairs. [11:00] >> Indeed. Well, I don't think uh gender [11:02] needs to be put into the the merit-based [11:06] values of designating anyone for any [11:09] position. Uh but that's, you know, um [11:13] off topic. Uh Mr. uh I' I'd like to ask [11:17] you specifically [11:19] on uh the aspect of enrichment. The [11:23] Iranians continue to contend that they [11:27] have the right under their uh [11:30] non-prololiferation [11:31] treaty uh uh admission so to speak since [11:36] when it uh happened uh during the years [11:38] of the sha they have the right to enrich [11:41] and as such they are unwilling to forgo [11:44] that right and are going to fight for [11:47] that right even if it comes at the [11:48] expense of you know continued [11:51] hostilities. Now, naturally, anyone who [11:55] understands anything about the Ayatollah [11:57] regime uh can clearly see their [12:00] continued aspirations of achieving [12:03] nuclear weapon capabilities. And [12:05] specifically [12:07] the enrichment [12:08] uh uh tool or or the enrichment pillar [12:12] rather is a very substantial uh [12:15] substantial part of being able to chart [12:19] that road map towards nuclear [12:21] proliferation. Is there a scenario in [12:24] which this could be a a gamecher from [12:28] America's perspective in your opinion? [12:32] Well, if if it if Iran's discovered [12:34] enriching uranium uh at all, that'll be [12:38] significant. If it detected making [12:40] weapon grade uranium, that would [12:42] certainly be a cause for war. Now, [12:46] on this question of a right to enrich, I [12:49] mean, there's a UN Security Council [12:51] resolution in effect that's [12:52] international law that says Iran has to [12:54] suspend its enrichment program. Iran has [12:57] violated the nuclear non-prololiferation [12:59] treaty, which is what it it argues gives [13:01] it that right. Uh as a as a violator of [13:04] the treaty, it it loses its rights. So [13:08] So I think it when Iran makes this [13:10] argument, it's a it's not a it's a false [13:12] claim and and rhetorical. Um, underneath [13:15] it is exactly what you're saying is a [13:17] determination to be able to enrich [13:19] uranium for for the current environment [13:23] for weapons purposes and and and so any [13:26] effort to enrich has to be opposed and [13:29] any agreement that's settled has to um [13:32] end enrichment or at least suspend it uh [13:35] for at least as Trump has said 20 years [13:39] and and that suspension should include a [13:42] dismantlement of its current capability. [13:44] ities sending the enriched uranium out [13:47] um not rebuilding its centrifuge [13:50] manufacturing complex. I mean that's the [13:52] old deal. The 2015 JCPOA allowed Iran to [13:57] to build up its you centrifuge [14:01] manufacturing capability while it [14:02] stopped enriching and that is a fatal [14:05] flaw in that deal and it shouldn't be [14:06] repeated. So, so I think that the [14:08] enrichment is one is easier to monitor [14:11] for and detect which is uh helpful, but [14:15] it if Iran is seen moving to enrich then [14:18] that could become a a reason to renew [14:21] military strikes [14:24] >> with emphasis on seen uh Dr. [14:27] looking at the unseen uh which uh your [14:32] former organization was very much uh [14:35] involved in trying to detect Iran's [14:37] nuclear efforts alongside other western [14:41] intelligence agencies and non-western [14:43] intelligence agencies. [14:45] um the the current state of Pickax [14:48] Mountain. Uh considering the reports of [14:51] the the uh insertion of uh various [14:56] cascades into that subterranean [14:59] infrastructure which is hardened and is [15:01] hard to penetrate at least from uh what [15:04] is publicly available. [15:07] uh what what can be done in order to [15:11] scrutinize those activities taking place [15:13] there? And uh to what degree is there [15:17] the need to go even one step further to [15:20] try and unveil the the various [15:23] activities currently undertaken by the [15:25] Iranians since they can still be active [15:29] um in the dark with obviously open [15:32] probes by the IAEA on undeclared nuclear [15:35] materials being uh located in Iran [15:39] already uh prior to the various [15:42] configurations that took place over the [15:44] past uh year and a half, two years. What [15:47] are we to make out of that? [15:51] >> Well, you know, the word uh being in the [15:53] dark is appropriate here. Um, [15:58] Israel has claimed and shown its ability [16:02] to having been present and capable of [16:06] obtaining intelligence [16:08] um rather effectively as demonstrated by [16:12] um activities that it undertook uh in [16:16] previous years. So you must assume that [16:18] it does have uh some ability uh which [16:22] comes from a variety of sources to know [16:25] more [16:26] uh no more and not just uh on the things [16:30] acted at at facilities but also possibly [16:35] on the positions taken by uh Iran's [16:38] leaders both visav uh their negotiations [16:44] at the current moment and their [16:46] intentions. Um but why am I saying the [16:50] word dark? because uh unlike other [16:53] instances uh the Israeli government is [16:57] very quiet um in uh sharing what may be [17:02] their intelligence on on such issues. um [17:07] whatever it has uh about activities at [17:10] those facilities, it must have made it [17:13] uh uh known through all kind of channels [17:17] and certainly shared with allies and [17:20] certainly with the US. But when it comes [17:23] to the plans and steps uh which uh the [17:28] Iranians are about to undertake uh there [17:31] is I don't see them uh providing us [17:35] openly what they probably know a bit but [17:40] possibly there is some some degree of [17:43] darkness in that as well. So this um [17:48] this uh lack of precise factual [17:53] um uh intelligence may be coloring our [17:57] current position. Israel's is also as uh [18:02] relevant to this because it takes a [18:04] position on what Israel itself might do. [18:08] uh it is clearly uh showing that it [18:12] would not shy away uh from need to take [18:15] action should the United States uh do [18:18] so. Um its activities, Israel's [18:22] activities are closely tailored to [18:25] America and America is calling the shots [18:29] at this moment. But uh you see in the [18:32] Israeli um deployment and position that [18:36] he takes seriously uh the possibility of [18:39] having to to attack even in the short [18:43] term and attack what well clearly attack [18:47] uh facilities and known targets. Um uh [18:52] so this is a a policy preference of [18:56] Israel today which is held in advance [18:59] but it's there possibly because uh the [19:03] assessment is that sooner or later it [19:06] will come to such a necessity. Uh it [19:10] will be seen that the Iranians are not [19:13] negotiating in good faith or not about [19:16] to come close to anything that may be [19:18] satisfactory. [19:20] Uh so uh that is the current state of [19:24] affairs and um so that is why if you ask [19:29] what is the assessment conveyed by the [19:32] Israeli military and government uh the [19:36] likelihood of action being called for is [19:39] considered to be quite significant. [19:43] >> Thank you Dr. W. Mr. [19:46] From what I remember, uh, the the the [19:50] civilian nuclear infrastructure that was [19:52] operated by the Russians in Iran was not [19:55] targeted. Is that still the case? [19:58] >> Yes, Busher was not targeted per se. [20:02] There were targets in the Busher area. [20:04] But you know the uh art not science of [20:07] diplomacy has to do with finding a [20:10] formula uh which would satisfy all sides [20:15] not only both parties uh the combatants [20:18] but all the others and perhaps the [20:21] operative word here is enriching uranium [20:26] on Iran's soil. if there would be um [20:31] another site. The people talked about [20:35] the uh uh TRR at once, the Russian uh [20:40] side. If Iran could agree that yes, it [20:44] would still have its right to enrich [20:47] uranium but not on its soil on some [20:51] friendly uh countries site under [20:56] monitoring and verification. [20:58] This could solve the problem but up to [21:01] now we haven't seen such a solution. [21:04] During the age of strategic power [21:06] competition, I have a hard time seeing [21:08] either China or Russia despite [21:10] declaratively highlighting the refusal [21:14] to see uh Iran gain nuclear uh weapons [21:18] and also privately uh to certain [21:21] circles. Um I don't see them becoming a [21:24] con constructive force. [21:26] >> Imagine diplomacy visa v Iran and the [21:28] United States. Imagine a Russia Ukraine [21:31] deal which also combines the end of the [21:33] Iran war. [21:34] >> Well, time will tell. But uh Mr. [21:37] Albbright, I I'd like to ask you uh two [21:39] aspects. One, what is happening at the [21:42] Busher uh nuclear reactor and to what [21:45] degree is there some connectivity to [21:48] Iran's other nuclear activities? And one [21:51] of the the gaps that was uh repeatedly [21:55] highlighted by IAEA Director General [21:58] Rafer Grossi was the the lack of [22:01] continuity of knowledge since Iran uh [22:05] frustrated [22:07] scrutiny of of its nuclear [22:09] infrastructure. [22:10] uh to what degree can the IAEA and [22:13] others reconstruct uh the uh the the [22:18] data in order to really understand where [22:21] all of the the nuclear cascades are and [22:24] or uh the the and rich materials are and [22:27] and really follow that uh that uh uh uh [22:32] rabbit hole to to gain clarity of the [22:36] situation. [22:38] >> Yeah. On my first question, I mean [22:39] Bushir for decade over two decades has [22:42] been carved out from what are called the [22:45] enrichment and reprocessing activities [22:47] and and just been allowed to to [22:51] be built uh and then operate um without [22:56] suffering sanctions and and it's been up [23:00] a little bit up and down on that during [23:02] the um last several years, but [23:05] essentially Busher is allowed to exist. [23:08] there was a conscious decision by the [23:09] United States and Israel to not attack [23:11] it and and try to really avoid um [23:15] damaging the site and they've stuck to [23:17] that. um Bushier 2 and three are being [23:21] built by the Russians and and that those [23:23] projects are ongoing and and Russians [23:25] stayed at the site at least some [23:27] Russians stayed at the site throughout [23:28] the this last year and and so that's [23:32] that's where it's at and and there's [23:33] been some recent calls to worry about [23:35] the plutonium and the spent fuel but I [23:37] think it the the sense is is that that's [23:39] a second order problem compared to what [23:41] we're facing and and and Russia's that [23:43] Russians are there. concerned about any [23:45] diversion. They provide the lowenriched [23:48] uranium. Iran can't make it can uh even [23:51] before the June war could not make [23:53] enough enriched uranium to fuel Busher [23:55] and certainly not Busher 2 and three [23:58] when they're done. So so the enrichment [24:00] program uh isn't going to Iranian [24:02] enrichment program isn't going to help [24:03] that problem and they're going to depend [24:05] on Russia and and therefore Russia is [24:07] not going to want to see plutonium [24:08] diverted from the spent fuel. Now the [24:12] bigger problem on in monitoring is that [24:14] the the IIA um would need to in a sense [24:17] start all over again. It would have to [24:18] approach Iran as a kind of a new state [24:22] coming into compliance with a [24:23] non-prololiferation treaty and and and [24:25] Iran would have to cooperate. I mean a [24:27] lot can be done if they cooperate. If [24:29] they don't, very little can be done. and [24:31] and and but it but in term if you add in [24:34] the the the lying and deception that [24:37] Iran did on its nuclear material. I mean [24:40] there were by June there were still [24:42] discrepancies involving undeclared [24:44] nuclear material or uranium metal and [24:47] and other types of other forms of [24:49] uranium and and and certainly there were [24:52] questions about um past and ongoing [24:55] nuclear weapons activities that that [24:57] were in violation of the NPT. So I think [25:00] you'd have to really start a new you'd [25:02] have the IIA would probably need to be [25:04] empowered with some additional um access [25:07] rights to both information and sites and [25:10] people in a sense you would want to put [25:13] something with a little more teeth [25:15] behind it. I mean, it's hard to envision [25:17] it could be like what happened in Iraq [25:19] in 1991 where the security council [25:22] mandated very intrusive inspections and [25:25] and and I was I participated in that and [25:27] it was a very different process than the [25:29] what you go through with with normal [25:32] safeguards and so something I think like [25:35] that needs to be put into place in Iran. [25:38] again less than what was done in in 1991 [25:40] but still something that that gets to [25:43] Iran providing a complete declaration [25:46] and and if it doesn't there could be [25:48] renewal of military operations. I mean [25:50] that was really the heart of the 91 deal [25:53] and and under normal safeguards that is [25:56] not the deal. I mean, you can go to the [25:59] board of governors, you can go to [26:00] security council, but you're not it's [26:02] not a ceasefire deal by any means, but [26:04] it but one has to be very pessimistic [26:06] that Iran would agree to that. It it was [26:08] one of the reasons the war started in [26:10] June 2025 is Iran absolutely refused to [26:14] cooperate with the IIA. So, I think if [26:16] if if the Iran is going to open up and [26:19] declare things honestly and completely, [26:23] probably going to have to be more Iran's [26:25] going to have to feel more defeated and [26:27] and more desperate in a sense to get [26:30] something um and would give up it its [26:34] its undeclared activities and cooperate [26:38] with the IIA to and to and some of it [26:40] will be very straight difficult but [26:43] straightforward like where is the [26:44] enriched uranium It's 10 tons uh [26:47] enriched uranium [26:50] focuses on the HU but where is that uh [26:53] how much is in for inaccessible how much [26:56] is at Esphahan tunnel complex how much [26:58] is there any at pickax mountain there's [27:00] been room rumors that some's there so I [27:03] think it the IA can handle that but it's [27:05] going to it's really going to need some [27:07] additional powers and and enforcement [27:10] um mechanisms behind it that are [27:12] guaranteed by the United states and [27:15] indirectly by Israel. [27:18] >> Well, uh thank you very much David uh uh [27:22] I'll I'll immediately say thank you [27:24] David Albbright and uh Dr. Uziad for all [27:28] of your insights today since we have uh [27:30] come to the end of our program today and [27:32] we truly appreciate all of your valuable [27:34] insights like also to thank Mr. Amir [27:37] Owen. [27:37] >> Thank you [27:38] >> and uh to thank you at home until our [27:40] next edition from here in Jerusalem. [27:42] Shalom. [27:57] >> [music]
